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Data Mining CEO Compensation 
Susan M. Adams   Atul Gupta   Dominique M. Haughton   John D.Leeth 
Bentley University 
 
 
The need to pre-specify expected interactions between variables is an issue in multiple regression. 
Theoretical and practical considerations make it impossible to pre-specify all possible interactions. The 
functional form of the dependent variable on the predictors is unknown in many cases. Two ways are 
described in which the data mining technique Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS) can be 
utilized: first, to obtain possible improvements in model specification, and second, to test for the 
robustness of findings from a regression analysis. An empirical illustration is provided to show how 
MARS can be used for both purposes. 
 
Key words: data mining, interactions, modeling, multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS), 
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Introduction 
 
The use of multiple regression analysis is 
widespread in empirical research. To use 
multiple regression analysis the full set of 
independent variables affecting the dependent 
variable must first be identified and all of the 
expected interactions among these explanatory 
variables specified. Since both theoretical and 
practical considerations make it impossible to 
pre-specify all possible interactions, the 
explanatory power of any given regression 
specification will be limited. In addition, while 
theory may provide guidance as to which 
predictors to use in a model, the functional form 
of the dependent variable on the predictors is 
unknown in many cases. This article describes 
two ways in which the data mining technique 
Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines 
(MARS) can be utilized: first, to obtain possible 
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two ways in which the data mining technique 
Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines 
(MARS) can be utilized: first, to obtain possible 
improvements in model specification, and 
second, to test for the robustness of findings 
from a regression analysis. An empirical 
illustration of how MARS can be used for both 
purposes is then provided.  
 The intuition underlying MARS is 
straightforward; the algorithm examines the data 
for all possible interactions among the specified 
explanatory variables and for non-linear 
relations between the dependent and explanatory 
variables and, in general, yields substantial 
improvements in explanatory power. Findings 
from the MARS analysis can be used in two 
possible ways. First, MARS may yield insight 
into possible empirical relationships that exist in 
data, but which have not been identified by the 
researcher. Such relationships can be examined 
for theoretical content and used to improve the 
specification of the regression model. 
 A second useful application of MARS is 
in the context of testing for the robustness of 
findings from a particular regression. For 
example, consider a research study interested in 
examining the relationship between employee 
gender and compensation. Because 
compensation is expected to depend on a variety 
of characteristics, the typical regression model 
includes a set of explanatory variables and a 
dummy variable to capture the gender effect. 
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The sign and statistical significance of the 
dummy variable and the explanatory power of 
the entire model depend on three factors: the 
choice of explanatory variables, the set of 
interactions included in the model, and the 
specified functional form of the dependent 
variable in terms of the predictors. While MARS 
can add no insight into the choice of explanatory 
variables, it can test for all possible interactions 
among the explanatory variables, the 
preponderance of which have not been included 
in a normal regression analysis. 
Moreover, MARS uses splines 
(understood here to be piecewise-linear 
functions) to allow for possible non-linearities in 
the data. Given that MARS will generally yield a 
substantial improvement in explanatory power, a 
finding that the sign and statistical significance 
of a variable of interest (the dummy variable for 
employee gender in our example) remains 
unchanged serves as a useful test for the 
robustness of the findings from the original 
regression. Normally, researchers using 
regression analysis provide the results from 
several model specifications to demonstrate the 
empirical strength of their conclusions. MARS 
provides a more structured approach to this 
model specification procedure and, thereby, 
generates a more powerful test of robustness. 
 
Methodology 
 
The Data 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) ExecuComp 
database was used to examine the compensation 
of male and female CEOs. This database tracks a 
variety of corporate data for the 1500 largest 
companies in the U.S. from 1992 to 2003 and 
personal and compensation data for their 
associated CEOs. From 1992 through 2003, 56 
women served as CEOs of the top 1500 
Standard & Poor’s companies in the United 
States; in contrast, 4,242 men served as 
corporate CEOs over the same time period. The 
ExecuComp database yielded 214 individual 
executive/year observations for female CEOs 
and 18,179 observations for male CEOs. The 
CEOs are scattered across 369 4-digit SIC 
industries. To control for possible industry 
effects in salary determination, analysis focused 
on CEOs employed in the forty-one 4-digit SIC 
industries with at least one female CEO. 
 Table 1 gives a summary of the 
variables used in the analysis. The left-hand side 
of the table provides information on the OLS 
sample and the right-hand side provides 
information on the MARS sample. To be 
included in an OLS regression an observation 
must have a complete set of information on all 
explanatory variables. The MARS sample is 
larger because the MARS procedure explicitly 
controls for missing values, allowing all 
observations with information on total 
compensation to be included in the analysis, an 
important advantage of MARS over OLS. 
 The dependent variable used was the 
logarithm of the CEO’s total compensation for 
the year, which includes salary, bonus, restricted 
stock, stock options (evaluated using the Black-
Scholes procedure), long-term incentive 
payouts, and other types of compensation. The 
independent variables are fairly standard. Most 
studies of wages and salaries include 
information on human capital such as education, 
general labor market experience, and experience 
within a specific company (Topel, 1991; Willis, 
1986). The ExecuComp data does not provide 
information on education and measures of 
experience are somewhat spotty. To capture 
human capital characteristics included in the 
analysis are age and the number of years the 
person has served as CEO. (For some CEOs, the 
data lists the date the person started working for 
the company. Unfortunately, the information 
was available for only 59.2 percent of the 
sample and so was not used in the analysis.) 
Because economic theory indicates that 
investments in human capital should have 
positive but diminishing returns, also included 
were squares of age and years as CEO. While 
early studies of the pay-performance relationship 
found little evidence of such a link (see Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990), some recent work documents 
that CEO compensation is related to company 
size and company performance (see Bebchuk & 
Grinstein, 2005). Company size is measured 
using the dollar value of sales revenue and 
company performance using the return on assets. 
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Finally, to control for differences in pay across 
industries and over time the OLS analysis 
includes binary variables measuring the 
company’s 1-digit SIC code and a linear time 
trend. The MARS analysis permits a more 
detailed investigation of industry and time 
effects. The MARS procedure includes a 
categorical variable representing 41 different 4-
digit SIC industries and a categorical variable 
representing 12 different years. All dollar figures 
for total  compensation and  sales revenue have  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
been adjusted to correct for the impact of 
inflation and are stated in 2003 dollars. 
 Table 1 uncovers only a few statistically 
significant differences in means or proportions 
between male and female CEOs. Within the 
four-digit SIC industries examined, female 
CEOs are a few years younger than their male 
counterparts and the companies they operate are 
more likely to be involved in trade and less 
likely to be involved in transportation. In terms 
of compensation, the data provide no evidence 
that male and female CEOs are paid differently. 
 
  
Table 1: Means (Standard Deviations) 
Variable 
OLS 
Sample 
Men 
OLS 
Sample 
Women 
Difference in 
Means 
(absolute t/z 
statistic) 
MARS 
Sample 
Men 
MARS 
Sample 
Women 
Difference in 
Means 
(absolute t/z 
statistic) 
Total Compensation 
(thousands of 2003 $) 
5,036 
(17,332) 
4,926 
(9,402) 
110 
(0.15) 
4,797 
(16,589) 
4,768 
(9,257) 
28 
(0.04) 
Log Total 
Compensation 
7.69 
(1.176) 
7.73 
(1.151) 
-0.04 
(0.43) 
7.64 
(1.170) 
7.68 
(1.157) 
-0.04 
(0.45) 
Age 53.96 (7.396) 
51.14 
(7.396) 
2.82 
(5.30)** 
54.13 
(7.937) 
51.03 
(7.327) 
3.09 
(5.96)** 
Years as CEO 8.11 (7.957) 
7.97 
(11.991) 
0.14 
(0.16) 
8.06 
(7.894) 
7.93 
(11.974) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
Sales 
(billions of 2003 $) 
2.93 
(7.228) 
2.70 
(8.576) 
0.23 
(0.37) 
2.85 
(7.033) 
2.63 
(8.440) 
0.22 
(0.37) 
Return on assets 
(Percent) 
0.10 
(29.129) 
1.68 
(15.773) 
-1.58 
(1.31) 
0.44 
(28.033) 
1.82 
(15.564) 
-1.38 
(1.19) 
Manufacturing 0.406 0.405 0.001 (0.03) 0.413 0.423 
-0.010 
(0.77) 
Transportation 0.149 0.049 0.100 (3.98)** 0.152 0.047 
0.105 
(4.23)** 
Trade 0.072 0.195 -0.123 (6.35)** 0.070 0.188 
-0.117 
(6.29)** 
Finance 0.049 0.078 -0.029 (1.88) 0.051 0.075 
-0.024 
(1.56) 
Services 0.324 0.273 0.051 (1.53) 0.314 0.268 
0.047 
(1.43) 
Number 3,689 205  4,058 213  
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The MARS methodology 
The MARS algorithm, proposed by 
Friedman in 1991, relies on the following basic 
ideas: 
For each continuous independent 
variable, MARS creates a piecewise linear 
function with too many change points (knots) to 
begin with, and then prunes unnecessary knots 
by a backward procedure. Consider the functions 
BF3 and BF4 (Basis Functions 3 and 4) 
identified by MARS (definitions of all Basis 
Functions are given in Appendix A). These two 
functions are preceded by BF1, as follows: 
 
BF1 = (SALES > .); 
BF3 = max(0, SALES – 1.747087) * BF1; 
BF4 = max(0, 1.747087 - SALES ) * BF1; 
 
BF1 is zero whenever the variable SALES is 
missing, and one otherwise. The functions BF3 
and BF 4, taken together, define a piecewise 
linear function of SALES, with a break point 
(otherwise referred to as a knot or a change 
point) at about 1.75 billion dollars. Note that 
BF3 is zero when SALES is less than 1.747, and 
BF4 is zero when SALES is greater than 1.747. 
Basis functions are chosen by MARS to achieve 
the best fit in a regression of the dependent 
variable on the Basis Functions. Of course, 
without any restriction on over-fitting, better and 
better fits will be attained by using more and 
more Basis Functions breaking at more and 
more knots. MARS uses a backward stepwise 
method to eliminate Basis Functions and knots 
which contribute least to the fit of the model. 
 For each independent categorical 
variable, MARS groups categories and creates 
dummy variables which correspond to these 
groups in such a way as to yield the best fit 
possible. For instance, the Basis Function BF5, 
given by the expression is: 
 
BF5 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 2 OR 
SICNEW = 5 OR SICNEW = 13 OR SICNEW 
= 15 OR SICNEW = 16 OR SICNEW = 21 OR 
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 23 OR SICNEW 
= 25 OR SICNEW = 26 OR SICNEW = 27 OR 
SICNEW = 28 OR SICNEW = 29 OR SICNEW 
= 31 OR SICNEW = 32) * BF1; 
 
BF5 equals one if the SICNEW code for an 
observation is one of those listed in the 
expression (1, 2, 5, 13, …, etc.), zero otherwise. 
This means that, of all the ways MARS 
considered to create a dummy variable that 
would represent a group of industries, the 
grouping in BF5 is one of the groupings it found 
would yield the best fit with the dependent 
variable. Other industry groupings are identified 
and expressed in other Basis Functions. 
 MARS looks for interactions among 
independent variables, by introducing into the 
model the product of two variables, if such an 
interaction leads to a sufficient improvement in 
the model. For example, the Basis Functions 
BF23 and BF24 represent an interaction of age 
with the number of years as CEO since BF21 
includes BF18 in its expression, which in turns 
includes age. An interesting aspect is that 
MARS can (and often will) create interactions, 
not between original variables, but between 
restrictions of these variables to a particular 
range as is done in BF23 and BF24. BF23 
(respectively BF24) interacts age with number 
of years as CEO, but only beyond 12 years as 
CEO (respectively up to 12 years as CEO), and 
in any case only up to ages of 43 years. BF23 
and BF24 have a different coefficient in the final 
model, so the strength of the interaction depends 
on the range of years as CEO involved in the 
interaction: it is stronger (.030) for BF24 than 
for BF23 (.019). 
 To summarize, MARS ends up with a 
collection of Basis Functions, which are 
transformations of independent variables taking 
into account non-linearities and interactions. 
MARS then estimates a least-squares model 
with a parsimonious set of Basis Functions as 
independent variables. Parsimony is achieved by 
removing Basis Functions, knots and 
interactions which do not contribute sufficiently 
to the model fit. 
 MARS, in essence, is an OLS 
procedure, but with judicious transformations of 
the independent variables. Risks of overfitting 
are controlled in various ways by the algorithm 
(Friedman, 1991, Section 3.6). To take into 
account the fact the data are used not only to 
estimate the coefficients of the Basis Functions 
but to create these Basis Functions in the first 
ADAMS, GUPTA, HAUGHTON, & LEETH 
 
565 
 
place, a penalized sum of squared residuals is 
minimized to select the final model (in least 
squares regression, a non-penalized sum of 
squares would be used). This is achieved by 
minimizing a quantity referred to as the 
Generalized Cross Validation (GCV) criterion 
equal to (1/N) SSR/[1-C(M)/N]2 (see Friedman, 
1991, p. 20), where N is the number of 
observations, SSR is the residual sum of squares, 
and C(M) is a measure of the complexity of a 
model with M Basis Functions.  The complexity 
C(M), which would equal M in usual least 
squares modeling, is defined to be equal to M + 
dM, where d is a penalty for each additional 
Basis Function. 
The parameter D can be determined in a 
number of ways: a value of 3 has been 
recommended on the basis of simulations in 
Friedman (1991), but a larger value may be 
appropriate for larger sample sizes. An 
alternative, used in this article, is to determine 
the parameter d via ten-fold cross validation (not 
to be confused with the GCV mentioned above, 
the GCV does not actually involve cross-
validation). Ten-fold cross- validation involves 
randomly dividing the data into ten parts, 
building the model – with various values of the 
parameter d – with nine tenths of the data, and 
evaluating the performance of the model on the 
remaining tenth. This is done ten times, for each 
tenth in turns, and the performance averaged out 
over the ten runs. The value of d yielding the 
best performance is selected, and the GCV 
criterion is computed with this value of d. A 
clearly over-fitting model is first built, and Basis 
Functions are removed one after the other, 
yielding a sequence of models with a decreasing 
number of Basis Functions. A model is selected 
from that sequence which minimizes the GCV 
criterion. 
 A convenient place to get information 
with introductions to the MARS methodology, 
white papers, and useful references is the 
Salford Systems Web site (www.salford-
systems.com). The article by De Veaux, et al. 
(1993) includes a good introduction to MARS, 
albeit in the context of chemical engineering, 
and contrasts the MARS methodology with that 
of neural networks. The article by Sephton 
(2001) gives an introduction to MARS and 
evaluates how well MARS performs at 
forecasting recessions; the author finds that for 
the time series considered for predicting 
recessions, MARS yields a better in-sample, but 
a worse out-of-sample performance than for 
instance probit regression (with a dependent 
variable of 1 if a time period was in recession, 0 
if not); this may indicate that the MARS models 
used in this context were over-fitting the data to 
some extent. This is the reason why it is 
recommended in the literature (Deichman, et. al. 
2002; Munoz & Felicisimo 2004) to evaluate 
MARS on validation samples, independent of 
the sample used to build the data, in order to 
select a MARS model that will not over-fit the 
data and will predict well on validation samples. 
This approach is adopted in Deichman, 
et al. (2002) where MARS is used in the context 
of direct response modeling; the authors find 
that response models which use MARS Basis 
Functions perform better than alternatives on 
independent validation samples. Munoz & 
Felicisimo contrast a MARS methodology with 
several alternatives and reach two interesting 
conclusions: one is that MARS yields the best 
predictive power, and the other is that an 
independent validation sample is truly needed 
(cross-validation is not sufficient). 
 The issue of over-fitting is considered 
later in this article and will explain why in our 
case over-fitting does not risk calling results into 
question. Finally, an article where MARS is 
used in analyses of living standards in Vietnam 
(see for example Deichman, et. al. (2001)), 
where interesting interactions are revealed 
between regions of the country and other 
predictors when modeling the logarithm of 
household expenditure per capita, indicating that 
such models of household wealth are likely to 
differ across regions, with the importance of 
some predictors varying across these regions. 
 
Results 
 
Table 2 presents the OLS results. As is typical, 
several specifications to check for robustness are 
included. The first specification includes only 
human capital characteristics, while the second 
augments these characteristics with information 
on the company. The third specification controls 
for differences in pay by industry and over time 
and the fourth specification interacts each 
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independent variable with the binary variable 
indicating the gender of the CEO. The last 
specification is a test to determine if any 
significant differences exist in how male and 
female CEOs are paid across the variables 
considered. In standard parlance, it is a test to 
determine if it is permissible to pool male and 
female CEOs in the same sample. 
 The results in Table 2 appear 
remarkably robust. In none of the first three 
specifications is the female binary variable 
statistically significant, indicating no difference 
in pay between male and female CEOs. 
Although in the fourth specification the F-
statistic indicates male and female CEOs are 
paid differently, the only statistically significant 
difference in CEO pay is in the transportation 
industry, but the positive interaction term points 
to female CEOs earning more than their male 
counterparts. In short, in terms of pay the data 
provide no evidence of discrimination against 
women once they have made it to the highest 
rung of the corporate ladder. Almost all other 
studies of gender differences in compensation 
find women earning far less than men, 
controlling for other factors including 
occupation and title (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001). 
 The other variables in Table 2 are also 
robust across the four empirical specifications in 
terms of statistical significance and absolute 
size. In all four specifications general experience 
as measured by age raises log total 
compensation but at a decreasing rate (the 
coefficient on age is significantly positive and 
the coefficient on age squared is significantly 
negative). Company size as measured by sales 
and company performance as measured by 
return on assets significantly boost CEO 
compensation. The positive coefficient on time 
demonstrates a substantial yearly increase in real 
CEO compensation and the negative coefficients 
on transportation and trade shows CEOs in these 
industries earn less, all else equal, than CEOs in 
manufacturing (the excluded category). The 
other variables are insignificant across all four 
specifications. 
 Appendix A presents the full set of 
MARS results. The MARS model explains 
about 46 percent of the variability in (logged) 
total compensation, compared to about 17 
percent for the OLS model. This improvement is 
due (in part) to the fact that MARS identifies 
groups of industries for which the compensation 
model differs, a matter very much at the heart of 
compensation modeling, and successfully 
includes interactions of these industry groupings 
and other independent variables. 
 Most important to our analysis, gender 
does not enter the model at all once the above 
mentioned interactions are included. Even 
following a very structured approach for 
determining model specification, an approach 
which investigates hundreds of possible 
interactions among the independent variables 
and allows for complex non-linear relationships 
to exist between the dependent and independent 
variables, the data still uncovers no difference in 
how male and female CEOs are compensated.  A 
maximum of 80 basis functions were allowed to 
be used in this MARS model, and ten-fold cross-
validation were used to evaluate models 
considered by MARS. The maximum number of 
basis functions allowed (80) is sufficient for 
MARS to build a large enough model from 
which to prune to get a satisfactory final model 
(such a maximum should be at least as large as 
about twice the number of basis functions in the 
final model; in this case the final model contains 
33 basis functions, so an initial maximum of 80 
basis functions is ample). To determine how 
much to prune (in other words how many basis 
functions to drop) to yield a final model, MARS 
uses as a measure of performance a modified R-
square measure referred to as the Generalized 
Cross Validation (GCV) criterion; the GCV 
incorporates a cost per basis function into its 
formula; the higher the cost, the smaller the 
number of basis functions in the final model. 
The choice of that cost is quite crucial, and is 
performed here by ten-fold cross validation, 
which consists in splitting the data into ten parts, 
using 9/10 of the data to build the model and the 
remaining tenth to evaluate candidate models 
corresponding to different choices of cost in 
order to select the cost that yields the best 
performance on the held out tenth of the data. 
Typically, and here as well, each tenth of the 
data plays the role of a hold-out sample in turns 
and performance is judged on all ten such 
samples. The absence of a gender effect in CEO 
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Table 2: OLS Results on Log Total Compensation ($2003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 3.118 4.442 3.806 3.773 
 (2.31)* (3.33)** (2.91)** (2.79)** 
Female 0.041 0.035 -0.060 2.193 
 (0.24) (0.22) (0.35) (0.36) 
Age 0.166 0.117 0.133 0.134 
 (3.29)** (2.38)* (2.71)** (2.65)** 
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (3.10)** (2.36)* (2.63)** (2.55)* 
Years CEO -0.011 -0.004 -0.011 -0.015 
 (0.96) (0.33) (1.03) (1.31) 
Years CEO squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.77) (0.45) (0.89) (1.05) 
Sales (billions  2003$)  0.049 0.049 0.049 
  (5.94)** (5.76)** (5.35)** 
Return on assets  0.003 0.004 0.004 
  (2.80)** (3.30)** (3.30)** 
Time   0.048 0.050 
   (6.13)** (6.24)** 
Transportation   -0.669 -0.694 
   (7.92)** (8.12)** 
Trade   -0.289 -0.330 
   (2.24)* (2.37)* 
Finance   -0.030 0.007 
   (0.19) (0.04) 
Service   -0.070 -0.083 
   (0.84) (0.98) 
Age×Female    -0.86 
    (0.36) 
Age squared×Female    0.001 
    (0.30) 
Years CEO×Female    0.104 
    (1.95) 
Years CEO squared×Female    -0.002 
    (1.90) 
Sales×Female    -0.002 
    (0.13) 
Return on assets×Female    -0.005 
    (0.96) 
Time×Female    -0.034 
    (0.80) 
Transportation×Female    0.967 
    (2.72)** 
Trade×Female    0.504 
    (1.31) 
Finance×Female    -0.586 
    (1.23) 
Service×Female    0.264 
    (0.69) 
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compensation is robust across empirical 
specifications. 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the MARS 
results. To simplify matters, the two tables 
present results only for observations in the data 
set where none of the independent variables are 
missing. When one or more independent 
variables is missing, the model adjusts for that in 
the equations (see for example BF1 in Appendix 
A, which captures the fact that the variable 
SALES is not missing), but the adjustments 
involve a fairly small number of observations 
(see Table 1). 
An examination of the basis functions in 
Appendix A reveals that, for observations 
without missing values, MARS identifies 
fourteen groups of Standard Industry Codes 
(SIC) among which it determines that the 
models for (log of) total compensation differ. 
Table 3 categorizes each of the 41 4-digit SIC 
industries by MARS-created SIC group. The 
first column of the table lists the industry’s 1-
digit SIC code, the second column provides a 
description of the 4-digit SIC industry, and the 
final columns of the table identify which of the 
14 broadly related MARS industries each 4-digit 
SIC industry belongs. The effects of the various 
industry variables on total compensation depend 
on these industry groups; as seen in Appendix A 
that a 4-digit industry can appear in multiple 
MARS groupings since different industry 
groupings can interact with different 
independent variables. 
Generally, researchers investigating 
industry effects classify firms based on the 
firm’s 1-digit or 2-digit SIC code. The OLS 
analysis in Table 2 allows CEO compensation to 
shift upward or downward depending on the 
firm’s  1-digit  SIC  industry.  The Swiss-cheese 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
appearance of Table 3 indicates, at least in terms 
of CEO compensation, that industry effects are 
far more complex than a simple upward or 
downward shift in compensation. Multiple 
industry interactions exist among the 
independent variables and the interactions are 
not grouped according to 1-digit or 2-digit SIC 
industry. 
 Table 4 presents the impact of each of 
the independent variables by industry. The 
notation with a plus sign (+) as a superscript 
indicates the expression in brackets is evaluated 
only for observations where the expression is 
positive. The expression is set equal to zero for 
all other observations. Blanks in the table 
indicate that the coefficient of the expression in 
the 1st column is zero for that particular industry 
group. For example, Panel A demonstrates that, 
as estimated in the MARS model, in SIC1 a one 
percentage point increase in a company’s return 
on assets (ROA) raises total CEO compensation 
by 1.4 percent (0.014 log points) when ROA is 
below 7.047 percent but by 3.6 percent (0.035 
log points) when ROA is above 7.047 percent. 
(In a log-linear specification a one-unit change 
in an independent variable causes a 1ˆ −βe  
percentage change in the dependent variable, 
where βˆ  is the estimated parameter. For small 
values, β is approximately equal to the 
percentage change.) In the second SIC group a 
one percentage point increase in ROA has no 
impact on log total CEO compensation when 
ROA is below 1.206 percent but, surprisingly, 
reduces total CEO compensation by 8.0 percent 
(0.077 log points) when ROA is above 1.206 
percent. MARS uncovers no significant impact 
on CEO compensation from higher ROAs in the 
other 12 industry groups. The OLS regressions 
presented in Table 2 model pay for performance 
Table 2: OLS Results on Log Total Compensation ($2003) (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
R-squared 0.02 0.12 0.17 0.18 
F-statistic: all coefficients = 0 3.04** 8.59** 14.44** 10.50** 
F-statistic: female and female interaction terms = 0 2.93** 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  Note: The t statistics are calculated using standard errors that 
correct for heteroskedasticity and the correlation among observations for the same individual. Industry 
results are measured relative to the excluded category, manufacturing. 
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as a general phenomenon across industries. The 
MARS methodology, in contrast, discovers 
ROA affecting CEO pay in only a few 4-digit 
SIC industries, meaning that pay for 
performance is far more limited than one might 
have originally thought. 
 The second panel in Table 4 reveals that 
in all industry groups except for SIC5 and to 
some extent SIC3, CEO compensation rose over 
time. The coefficient on year is generally zero 
from 1992 to 1997 but positive for years 1998 to 
2003. The parameter of 0.206 on the years 1998 
to 2003 indicates that, all else equal, CEOs 
earned about 23 percent more in these years than 
in the years from 1992 to 1997 in industry 
groups other than SIC3, SIC4, and SIC5. The 
largest jump in salaries over time occurs in SIC4 
where the impact of year moves from a -0.439 
log points for years 1992 to 1997 to a +0.206 log 
points for years 1998 to 2003. Other studies also 
find a rise in CEO salaries in the 1990s 
(Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005). The MARS 
results indicate not a general upward trend in 
CEO compensation in the 1990s, as implied by 
the OLS results in Table 2, but a structural break 
in compensation occurring in 1998. 
 As can be seen in Panel C, the impact of 
an additional year of CEO experience 
(YRSCEO) depends on the age of the CEO, a 
rough proxy for general labor market 
experience, and the overall level of CEO 
experience. For CEOs younger than 43 an 
additional year of CEO experience lowers total 
compensation for individuals serving as CEO for 
less than 12 years but raises it for individuals 
serving as CEO for more than 12 years. For 
CEOs older than 43 an additional year of CEO 
experience has no impact on total compensation 
except in SIC2 where the impact of greater CEO 
experience is positive and SIC3 where the 
impact of greater CEO experience is negative for 
individuals serving as CEO for less than 1.63 
years. 
 The MARS results on CEO experience 
are in contrast to the OLS results in Table 2. 
OLS finds no impact of CEO experience on total 
compensation, while MARS discovers additional 
CEO experience raising compensation in some 
cases but lowering it in others. The 
counterintuitive results of CEO experience 
reducing compensation apply to very few 
observations in the sample. Only 249 of the 
sample observations are for CEOs younger than 
43 with less than 12 years of CEO experience 
(6.4 percent) and only 340 observations are for 
CEOs with less than 1.63 years CEO experience 
in industry group SIC3 (8.7 percent). 
The positive impact of CEO experience 
on compensation pertains to many more 
observations: 926 observations in SIC2 have 
more than 0.583 years of CEO experience and 
are older than 43 (23.8 percent) and 30 
observations are for CEOs younger than 43 with 
more than 12 years CEO experience (0.8%). For 
the remaining 2,163 observations (55.5 percent) 
MARS finds no impact on compensation from 
greater CEO experience. In other words, the 
MARS results indicate for the vast majority of 
CEOs greater CEO experience has either a 
positive or a neutral impact on compensation 
although for a few CEOs in some industries and 
at some levels of general and CEO-specific 
experience greater years heading the company 
reduces compensation. 
 Panel D shows the impact on CEO 
compensation from increases in company size as 
measured by sales revenue. As can be seen, the 
impact of company size depends on the 
company’s current level of sales, the age of the 
CEO, and the industry. Ignoring the age effect, 
an increase in sales has a larger impact when a 
company is small, sales less than $1.7471 billion 
(70.9 percent of the sample), than when it is 
large, sales greater than $1.7471. 
Age augments the impact of sales on 
CEO compensation for CEOs older than 43 in 
companies with less than $8.1352 billion in sales 
revenue and for CEOs younger than 43 in 
companies with less than $4.4857 billion in sales 
revenue. Evaluated at the mean age of 53.8, a $1 
billion dollar increase in sales revenue raises 
CEO compensation in most industry groups by 
75.5 percent for companies with sales of less 
than $1.7471 billion, by 6.3 percent for 
companies with sales between $1.7471 billion 
and $8.1352 billion, and by 1.82 percent for 
companies with sales greater than $8.1352 
billion. Mathematically, company size appears 
to raise CEO compensation but at a decreasing 
rate. 
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Table 3. MARS identified industry groups 
1-digit SIC 
Industry 4-digit SIC Industry 
SIC1 
BF5 
SIC2 
BF25 
SIC3 
BF6 
SIC4 
BF13 
SIC5 
BF61 
SIC6 
BF73 
SIC7 
BF45 
SIC8 
BF43 
SIC9 
BF11 
SIC10 
BF7 
SIC11 
BF57 
SIC12 
BF19 
SIC13 
BF51 
SIC14 
BF75 
Mfg Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton                    
Mfg Apparel & Other Finished Prods of Fabrics & Similar Mat’l                  
Mfg Men's & Boys' Furnishings, Work Clothing, & Allied Garments                         
Mfg Newspapers: Publishing or Publishing & Printing                      
Mfg Commercial Printing                   
Mfg Pharmaceutical Preparations                    
Mfg Biological Products, (No Diagnostic Substances)                       
Mfg Perfumes, Cosmetics & Other Toilet Preparations                    
Mfg Pottery & Related Products                     
Mfg Special Industry Machinery, NEC                   
Mfg Computer & Office Equipment                    
Mfg Computer Peripheral Equipment, NEC                     
Mfg Electric Housewares & Fans                     
Mfg Telephone & Telegraph Apparatus                   
Mfg Motor Vehicle Parts & Accessories                  
Mfg Motor Homes                   
Mfg Electromedical & Electrotherapeutic Apparatus                    
Mfg Dolls & Stuffed Toys                    
Mfg Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries                      
Trans, Comm 
& Utilities Communications Services, NEC                     
Trans, Comm 
& Utilities Electric Services                    
Trans, Comm 
& Utilities Natural Gas Distribution                       
Trade Retail-Apparel & Accessory Stores                     
Trade Retail-Women's Clothing Stores                     
Trade Retail-Furniture Stores                   
Trade Retail-Drug Stores & Proprietary Stores                 
Trade Retail-Jewelry Stores                   
Trade Retail-Catalog & Mail-Order Houses                    
Finance, Ins, 
Real Estate 
Savings Institution, Federally 
Chartered                  
Finance, Ins, 
Real Estate Patent Owners & Lessors                   
Services Services-Personal Services                     
Services Services-Help Supply Services                    
Services Services-Computer Programming, Data Processing, etc.                   
Services Services-Prepackaged Software                      
Services Services-Computer Integrated Systems Design                     
Services Services-Telephone Interconnect Systems                 
Services Services-Business Services, NEC                       
Services Services-Medical Laboratories                       
Services Services-Child Day Care Services                   
Services Services-Research, Accounting, Engineering, Management                   
Services Services-Commercial Physical & Biological Research                    
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Table 4: MARS Results on Log Total Compensation 
Panel A: Return on Assets (ROA) 
 SIC1 
BF5 
SIC2 
BF25 
SIC3 
BF6 
SIC4 
BF13 
SIC5 
BF61 
SIC6 
BF73 
SIC7 
BF45 
SIC8 
BF43 
SIC9 
BF11 
SIC10 
BF7 
SIC11 
BF57 
SIC12 
BF19 
SIC13 
BF51 
SIC14 
BF75 
(ROA−7.047)+ 0.035              
(7.047−ROA)+ -0.014              
(ROA−1.206)+  -0.077             
Panel B: Year 
 SIC1 
BF5 
SIC2 
BF25 
SIC3 
BF6 
SIC4 
BF13 
SIC5 
BF61 
SIC6 
BF73 
SIC7 
BF45 
SIC8 
BF43 
SIC9 
BF11 
SIC10 
BF7 
SIC11 
BF57 
SIC12 
BF19 
SIC13 
BF51 
SIC14 
BF75 
Yrs 98-03 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.051 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206 
Yrs 92-97    -0.439 0.225          
Yrs 92,93,95,98,03   -0.228            
Panel C: CEO Tenure (YRSCEO) 
 SIC1 BF5 
SIC2 
BF25 
SIC3 
BF6 
SIC4 
BF13 
SIC5 
BF61 
SIC6 
BF73 
SIC7 
BF45 
SIC8 
BF43 
SIC9 
BF11 
SIC10 
BF7 
SIC11 
BF57 
SIC12 
BF19 
SIC13 
BF51 
SIC14 
BF75 
(YRSCEO−.583)+  0.018             
(1.63−YRSCEO)+   0.350            
(YRSCEO−12.0)+x
(43−AGE)+ 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
(12−YRSCEO)+x 
(43−AGE) + 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 
Panel D: Sales Revenue (SALES), in billions 2003 $ 
 SIC1 BF5 
SIC2 
BF25 
SIC3 
BF6 
SIC4 
BF13 
SIC5 
BF61 
SIC6 
BF73 
SIC7 
BF45 
SIC8 
BF43 
SIC9 
BF11 
SIC10 
BF7 
SIC11 
BF57 
SIC12 
BF19 
SIC13 
BF51 
SIC14 
BF75 
(SALES−1.7471)+ 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 -0.019 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.077 
(1.7471−SALES)+ -0.519 -0.519 -0.519 -0.519 -0.519 -0.519 -0.519 -0.821 -0.519 -0.519 -0.519 -0.519 -0.519 -0.519 
(0.2881−SALES)+  -3.000             
(8.1352−SALES)+
x(AGE−43)+ -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
(4.4857−SALES)+
x(43−AGE)+ 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 
Panel E: Age of the CEO (AGE) 
 SIC1 
BF5 
SIC2 
BF25 
SIC3 
BF6 
SIC4 
BF13 
SIC5 
BF61 
SIC6 
BF73 
SIC7 
BF45 
SIC8 
BF43 
SIC9 
BF11 
SIC10 
BF7 
SIC11 
BF57 
SIC12 
BF19 
SIC13 
BF51 
SIC14 
BF75 
(AGE−43)+ 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.017 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 -0.016 0.035 0.035 
(43−AGE) +             0.201  
(AGE−54) + -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 
(AGE−43)+x 
(8.1352−SALES)+ -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
(43-AGE)+x 
(4.4857-SALES)+ 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 
(43−AGE)+x 
(YRSCEO−12)+ 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
(43−AGE)+x 
(12−YRSCEO)+ 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 
Note: Table 3 lists the specific 4-digit SIC industries comprising each SIC industry grouping. A superscript on a 
bracketed term indicates the expression is evaluated only for observations where the expression is positive. The 
expression equals zero for all other observations. Blanks in the table indicate the associated industry effect is zero. 
The table presents results only for observations with information on all independent variables. Appendix A 
presents the full set of MARS results including the impact of missing values. 
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 The OLS results in Table 2 examine the 
impact of sales revenue on CEO compensation 
but the impact of sales is assumed to be linear. 
The MARS results suggest that a more 
appropriate specification would include sales 
revenue and sales revenue squared to allow for 
the positive but diminishing returns from 
company size. (When both sales revenue and 
sales revenue squared are included in the OLS 
regression both coefficients are highly 
statistically significant (p values < 0.001) but the 
inclusion alters the size and significance of the 
other coefficients only slightly.) In Table 2 
across all specifications, an additional $1 billion 
of sales revenue creates a 5.0 percent increase in 
CEO compensation. In Table 3, an additional $1 
billion of sales revenue creates in most 
industries a 6.3 percent increase in CEO 
compensation when evaluated at the sample 
means of age and sales revenue ($2.914 billion). 
 The final panel of Table 4 reports the 
impact of age on CEO compensation. The last 
four rows of the Panel E simply duplicate the 
interactive results on age and sales and age and 
years as CEO discussed previously. Across all 
age groups higher sales revenue either expands 
the positive impact of age on total compensation 
or contracts the negative impact – the interaction 
between age and sales is positive. Surprisingly, 
for CEOs younger than 43 an additional year of 
general experience as measured by age reduces 
total compensation, all else equal. The reduction 
is smaller as years as CEO expands for CEOs 
serving for fewer than 12 years but is larger as 
years as CEO expands for CEOs serving more 
than 12 years. In all but SIC13 an additional 
year of general experience raises total 
compensation by 1.42 percent for CEOs from 43 
to 54 but reduces total compensation by 7.56 
percent for CEOs older than 54 when evaluated 
at the mean level of sales. The influence of age 
on total compensation is not impacted by years 
as CEO for CEOs older than 43. 
 The stereotypical age/earnings profile 
has a worker’s earnings rising steeply early in 
his or her career, leveling off over time, and then 
declining. Researchers include age and age 
squared as independent variables in an OLS 
analysis of earnings to capture the positive but 
diminishing impact of general experience on 
earnings and to allow for the possibility of 
earnings hitting a peak at some point. Based on 
the OLS results, CEO compensation hits a peak 
somewhere between 54.9 and 57.2 years of age 
depending on the empirical specification. 
Although the MARS results do not reproduce 
the standard leveling off of earnings, they do 
indicate an earnings peak at age 54, a result 
largely consistent with the OLS analysis. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In most empirical investigations theory guides 
the selection of independent variables but rarely 
dictates the functional relationship between the 
dependent and the independent variables or 
specifies all possible interactions among the 
independent variables. Consequently, 
researchers generally present several sets of 
results generated using slightly different 
estimating relationships to demonstrate that the 
conclusions of the analysis are robust to model 
specification. Multivariate Adaptive Regression 
Splines (MARS) is a data mining technique that 
examines data for all possible interactions 
among specified explanatory variables and for 
non-linear relations between the dependent and 
explanatory variables. By using MARS 
researchers can check for the robustness of their 
empirical findings in a highly structured manner, 
thereby providing a more convincing case that 
the results are insensitive to model specification. 
Additionally, MARS may uncover relationships 
that can be examined for theoretical content and 
aid future research in the area. 
 As an example of how MARS can be 
used as a procedure to check for robustness and 
as an aid in future research, we examine data on 
CEO compensation to determine if pay 
differences exist between men and women. Most 
studies find men out earn women by a sizable 
margin even after controlling for differences in 
education, experience, and occupation (Altonji 
& Blank, 1999; Bertrand & Hallock, 2001; 
Stanley & Jarrell, 1998). Using standard OLS 
analysis we find no evidence male CEOs have 
an advantage over female CEOs in terms of 
compensation. Across the four empirical 
specifications we examine female CEOs earn the 
same or more than male CEOs, all else equal.  In 
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the MARS methodology the variable 
representing gender never enters the model 
indicating that no significant pay difference 
exists between male and female CEOs. The 
MARS model controls for observable 
characteristics and considers all possible 
interactions among the observable 
characteristics and total compensation in 
addition to potential nonlinearities in the 
relationships between the observable 
characteristics and total compensation. In short, 
the absence of a gender effect on CEO 
compensation is robust. 
 In terms of the other factors affecting 
CEO compensation, OLS generates a fairly 
standard picture of CEO compensation. All else 
equal, CEOs leading larger companies as 
measured by sales revenue, more profitable 
companies as measured by return on assets, and 
who have more general labor market experience 
as measured by age earn more than CEOs 
leading smaller companies, less profitable 
companies, and who have less general labor 
market experience. Over time CEO 
compensation has expanded by almost 5 percent 
per year in real terms and CEOs in 
transportation and trade earn less than CEOs in 
manufacturing. Inconsistent with the human 
capital model of earnings, OLS finds no reward 
for CEO experience. 
 The MARS results are generally 
consistent with the OLS results but with some 
important distinctions. Similar to OLS, MARS 
finds sizable differences in CEO compensation 
across industries. Unlike OLS, the MARS 
grouping of industries is unrelated to a broader 
industry classification such as a 1- or 2-digit SIC 
code. Further, the MARS industry effects do not 
simply increase or decrease compensation but 
instead interact with the other independent 
variables, suggesting the underlying model of 
compensation varies by industry groupings. 
However, note that these industry groupings are 
not the recognized industry groups based on 1- 
or 2-digit SIC codes. Similar to OLS, MARS 
shows CEO compensation rising over time, but 
unlike OLS the rise is not gradual. In most of the 
MARS industry groups a structural break in 
compensation occurs in 1998 causing CEO pay 
to jump by about 23 percent. In the OLS 
analysis, the impact of return on assets is 
modeled as a general phenomenon across 
industries. The MARS analysis finds return on 
assets raising CEO compensation but in only one 
broad industry grouping – meaning pay for 
performance is fairly limited. The OLS analysis 
uncovers a positive, linear relationship between 
sales revenue and CEO compensation. The 
MARS results suggest sales revenue has a 
positive but diminishing impact on CEO 
compensation. In the OLS analysis, the number 
of years a person has served as CEO appears to 
have no impact on compensation, while MARS 
finds CEO experience raising total compensation 
but only in a few industry groupings. Finally, 
OLS indicates a CEO’s age, a proxy for general 
labor market experience, raises total 
compensation but at a decreasing rate, a result in 
line with the human capital model and the 
stereotypical age/earnings profile. MARS finds a 
far more complex relationship with 
compensation falling, rising, and then falling 
again as the CEO ages. Both the OLS and the 
MARS results imply CEO compensation peaks 
at around 54 years of age. 
 It is not suggested that MARS be used 
as a replacement to the standard procedures of 
model building and hypothesis testing. Instead, 
MARS may be viewed as a complement to the 
more traditional methods of analysis. There are 
implications for practicing managers to consider 
when evaluating the use of MARS and OLS. For 
the manager who wants to understand the 
dynamics of executive compensation, the MARS 
model provides more details about the specifics 
related his or her particular situation (e.g., the 
industry grouping formed by MARS and 
corresponding interactions). By examining data 
for unanticipated and possibly complex 
interactions among the independent variables 
and for potential nonlinear relationships between 
the dependent and independent variables, MARS 
allows researchers to conduct a structured test of 
robustness and determine important areas for 
future research. In particular, the MARS 
analysis of CEO compensation suggests 
additional work is required to determine the 
factors causing the compensation explosion in 
1998, the reasons for the paucity of pay for 
performance, and the elements generating 
common compensation practices across 
industries. 
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Appendix A: The MARS model; basis functions 
and estimated equation 
 
Basis Functions 
BF1 = (SALES > .); 
BF3 = max(0, SALES – 1.747087) * BF1; 
BF4 = max(0, 1.747087 - SALES ) * BF1; 
BF5 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 2 OR 
SICNEW = 5 OR SICNEW = 13 OR 
SICNEW = 15 OR SICNEW = 16 OR 
SICNEW = 21 OR SICNEW = 22 OR 
SICNEW = 23 OR SICNEW = 25 OR 
SICNEW = 26 OR SICNEW = 27 OR 
SICNEW = 28 OR SICNEW = 29 OR 
SICNEW = 31 OR SICNEW = 32) * BF1; 
BF6 = (SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 4 OR 
SICNEW = 6 OR SICNEW = 7 OR 
SICNEW = 8 OR SICNEW = 9 OR 
SICNEW = 10 OR SICNEW = 11 OR 
SICNEW = 12 OR SICNEW = 14 OR 
SICNEW = 17 OR SICNEW = 18 OR 
SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 20 OR 
SICNEW = 24 OR SICNEW = 30 OR 
SICNEW = 33 OR SICNEW = 34 OR 
SICNEW = 35 OR SICNEW = 36 OR 
SICNEW = 37 OR SICNEW = 38 OR 
SICNEW = 39 OR SICNEW = 40 OR 
SICNEW = 41) * BF1; 
BF7 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 3 OR 
SICNEW = 4 OR SICNEW = 10 OR 
SICNEW = 11 OR SICNEW = 12 OR 
SICNEW = 13 OR SICNEW = 16 OR 
SICNEW = 20 OR SICNEW = 21 OR 
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 24 OR 
SICNEW = 25 OR SICNEW = 28 OR 
SICNEW = 35 OR SICNEW = 38 OR 
SICNEW = 39 OR SICNEW = 41); 
BF9 = (YEAR = 1998 OR YEAR = 1999 OR 
YEAR = 2000 OR YEAR = 2001 OR 
YEAR = 2002 OR YEAR = 2003) * BF1; 
BF10 = (YEAR = 1992 OR YEAR = 1993 OR 
YEAR = 1994 OR YEAR = 1995 OR 
YEAR = 1996 OR YEAR = 1997) * BF1; 
BF11 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 3 OR 
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 25 OR 
SICNEW = 27 OR SICNEW = 28 OR 
SICNEW = 34) * BF3; 
BF13 = (SICNEW = 4 OR SICNEW = 6 OR 
SICNEW = 7 OR SICNEW = 8 OR 
SICNEW = 11 OR SICNEW = 13 OR 
SICNEW = 17 OR SICNEW = 21 OR 
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 24 OR 
SICNEW = 33 OR SICNEW = 35 OR 
SICNEW = 37 OR SICNEW = 38) * 
BF10; 
BF15 = (AGE > .) * BF1; 
BF16 = (AGE = .) * BF1; 
BF17 = max(0, AGE - 43.000) * BF15; 
BF18 = max(0, 43.000 - AGE ) * BF15; 
BF19 = (SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 9 OR 
SICNEW = 14 OR SICNEW = 20 OR 
SICNEW = 32 OR SICNEW = 33 OR 
SICNEW = 34 OR SICNEW = 37 OR 
SICNEW = 40) * BF17; 
BF21 = (YRSCEO > .) * BF18; 
BF23 = max(0, YRSCEO - 11.997) * BF21; 
BF24 = max(0, 11.997 - YRSCEO ) * BF21; 
BF25 = (SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 7 OR 
SICNEW = 8 OR SICNEW = 9 OR 
SICNEW = 13 OR SICNEW = 28 OR 
SICNEW = 30 OR SICNEW = 32 OR 
SICNEW = 34 OR SICNEW = 36 OR 
SICNEW = 37 OR SICNEW = 38); 
BF27 = (SALES > .) * BF25; 
BF30 = max(0, 0.288101 - SALES ) * BF27; 
BF32 = max(0, 8.135196 - SALES ) * BF17; 
BF33 = (YEAR = 1992 OR YEAR = 1993 OR 
YEAR = 1995 OR YEAR = 1998 OR 
YEAR = 2003) * BF6; 
BF35 = (ROA > .) * BF5; 
BF37 = max(0, ROA - 7.047) * BF35; 
BF38 = max(0, 7.047 - ROA ) * BF35; 
BF39 = (YRSCEO > .) * BF25; 
BF40 = (YRSCEO = .) * BF25; 
BF41 = max(0, YRSCEO - 0.583) * BF39; 
BF43 = (SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 6 OR 
SICNEW = 9 OR SICNEW = 10 OR 
SICNEW = 12 OR SICNEW = 13 OR 
SICNEW = 14 OR SICNEW = 15 OR 
SICNEW = 16 OR SICNEW = 17 OR 
SICNEW = 18 OR SICNEW = 19 OR 
SICNEW = 20 OR SICNEW = 21 OR 
SICNEW = 30 OR SICNEW = 31 OR 
SICNEW = 33 OR SICNEW = 34 OR 
SICNEW = 35 OR SICNEW = 37 OR 
SICNEW = 38 OR SICNEW = 40 OR 
SICNEW = 41) * BF4; 
BF45 = (SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 4 OR 
SICNEW = 6 OR SICNEW = 7 OR 
SICNEW = 8 OR SICNEW = 9 OR 
SICNEW = 10 OR SICNEW = 11 OR 
SICNEW = 12 OR SICNEW = 18 OR 
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SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 23 OR 
SICNEW = 24 OR SICNEW = 35 OR 
SICNEW = 37 OR SICNEW = 38 OR 
SICNEW = 39) * BF17; 
BF47 = (AGE > .) * BF39; 
BF49 = max(0, AGE - 54.000) * BF47; 
BF51 = (SICNEW = 4 OR SICNEW = 6 OR 
SICNEW = 7 OR SICNEW = 14 OR 
SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 21 OR 
SICNEW = 23 OR SICNEW = 37) * 
BF21; 
BF53 = (ROA > .) * BF40; 
BF55 = max(0, ROA - 1.206) * BF53; 
BF57 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 2 OR 
SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 5 OR 
SICNEW = 7 OR SICNEW = 8 OR 
SICNEW = 15 OR SICNEW = 17 OR 
SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 22 OR 
SICNEW = 23 OR SICNEW = 24 OR 
SICNEW = 26 OR SICNEW = 28 OR 
SICNEW = 29 OR SICNEW = 31 OR 
SICNEW = 37 OR SICNEW = 38 OR 
SICNEW = 39 OR SICNEW = 41) * BF1; 
BF59 = (SICNEW = 12 OR SICNEW = 19 OR 
SICNEW = 24 OR SICNEW = 26 OR 
SICNEW = 30 OR SICNEW = 34) * 
BF16; BF61 = (SICNEW = 3 OR 
SICNEW = 7 OR SICNEW = 12 OR 
SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 20 OR 
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 23 OR 
SICNEW = 25 OR SICNEW = 28 OR 
SICNEW = 32 OR SICNEW = 35) * 
BF10; 
BF63 = (YRSCEO = .) * BF9; 
BF64 = (YRSCEO > .) * BF9; 
BF66 = max(0, 4.485668 - SALES ) * BF21; 
BF67 = (SICNEW = 2 OR SICNEW = 5 OR 
SICNEW = 6 OR SICNEW = 7 OR 
SICNEW = 14 OR SICNEW = 16 OR 
SICNEW = 21 OR SICNEW = 31 OR 
SICNEW = 34 OR SICNEW = 40) * 
BF63; 
BF73 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 3 OR 
SICNEW = 4 OR SICNEW = 5 OR 
SICNEW = 9 OR SICNEW = 11 OR 
SICNEW = 12 OR SICNEW = 13 OR 
SICNEW = 17 OR SICNEW = 18 OR 
SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 20 OR 
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 24 OR 
SICNEW = 27 OR SICNEW = 31 OR 
SICNEW = 32 OR SICNEW = 35 OR 
SICNEW = 37) * BF64; 
BF75 = (SICNEW = 2 OR SICNEW = 4 OR 
SICNEW = 5 OR SICNEW = 7 OR 
SICNEW = 16 OR SICNEW = 18 OR 
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 23 OR 
SICNEW = 29 OR SICNEW = 30 OR 
SICNEW = 31 OR SICNEW = 32 OR 
SICNEW = 34 OR SICNEW = 38 OR 
SICNEW = 40 OR SICNEW = 41) * BF3; 
BF77 = (YRSCEO > .) * BF6; 
BF80 = max(0, 1.626 - YRSCEO ) * BF77; 
 
Estimated Equation 
Y = 6.661 + 2.206 * BF1 + 0.0177346 * BF3 - 
0.518625 * BF4 - 1.014 * BF5 - 0.399 * 
BF7 + 0.206 * BF9 - 0.203566 * BF11 - 
0.439 * BF13 + 0.035 * BF17 - 0.051 * 
BF19 - 0.595 * BF21 + 0.019 * BF23 + 
0.030 * BF24 + 0.408 * BF25 – 3.000 * 
BF30 - 0.00353013 * BF32 - 0.228 * 
BF33 + 0.035 * BF37 - 0.014 * BF38 + 
0.018 * BF41 - 0.301961 * BF43 - 0.018 * 
BF45 - 0.052 * BF49 + 0.201 * BF51 - 
0.077 * BF55 - 0.158 * BF57 - 0.869 * 
BF59 + 0.225 * BF61 + 0.0589534 * 
BF66 - 0.762 * BF67 - 0.155 * BF73 + 
0.0590723 * BF75 + 0.350 * BF80; 
 
Appendix B: Variables 
 
AGE = age of the CEO. 
NEWSIC = 4-digit SIC industry. NEWSIC is a 
categorical variable ranging from 1 
(Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton) 
to 41 (Services-Commercial 
Physical & Biological Research). 
See Table 3 for a complete listing of 
the 4-digit SIC industries. 
ROA = return on assets. 
SALES = sales revenue in billions of 2003 $. 
Y = log of total compensation. 
YEAR = observation year. 
YRSCEO = years serving as CEO. 
 
